The current policy check for keystores in Secrets creates a loop because
the truststore.jks or truststore.p12 will never exist when the issuer didn't
provide the CA certificate. This behaviour was introduced by #5597
The JKS and PKCS12 truststores are only added to the Secret
if the CA is provided by the issuer. The CertificateRequest API
reference states:
> The PEM encoded x509 certificate of the signer, also known
> as the CA (Certificate Authority). This is set on a best-effort basis by
> different issuers. If not set, the CA is assumed to be unknown/not available.
This change will only check the PKCS12/JKS truststores if the CA cert from the
issuer exists in the secret.
Fixes#5755
Signed-off-by: Thomas Müller <thomas@chaschperli.ch>
This does not actually change how the informers work. This also adds a partial metadata client to root context
Signed-off-by: irbekrm <irbekrm@gmail.com>
Changing SecretRef to be a pointer will break people using the package as
a library.
I disabled the ability to set the audience and expiry time for security
reasons:
We decided to generate the audience dynamically instead of letting the
user configure it, and we also decided to encode the namespace and
issuer name into the audience to remediate the risk of hijacking an
existing issuer and service account with a malicious issuer.
Regarding the expiration duration of the JWT, it doesn't make sense to
let the user configure it since cert-manager will authenticate using the
JWT and immediately discard it. We thought that 1 minute would be
acceptable, although the Kubernetes API server may return a totally
different duration.
Signed-off-by: Maël Valais <mael@vls.dev>
Previously, the Vault issuer was only able to use a Secret in order to
use the "Kubernetes authentication" method. The downside to this service
account Secret token is that it has the default JWT iss
"kubernetes/serviceaccount" (along with the fact that the token is not
bound to a particular pod and has no expiry).
With the new serviceAccountRef, cert-manager now requests the token on
behalf of the pod in order to authenticate with Vault.
Signed-off-by: Maël Valais <mael@vls.dev>
Makes sure that when an unlabelled Secret is encountered at any point (even outside issuance) it will be labelled
Signed-off-by: irbekrm <irbekrm@gmail.com>
Previously it wasn't possible to set a custom CA bundle for an ACME
server, leading users to either patch the cert-manager system CA bundle
manually or else use SkipTLSVerify which is a security issue.
This adds CABundle for ACME, similar to what we have for Vault and
Venafi TPP issuers.
Longer term we'd like to have a more fully featured approach. It would
for example make sense to support loading CA bundles from ConfigMaps or
Secrets (similar to what we do for Vault issuers today), but for now this
change is the simplest change.
Signed-off-by: Ashley Davis <ashley.davis@jetstack.io>
Clarifies language a little; makes it clearer that the bundle
should be base64 encoded. Previously it was slightly confusing
in that PEM certificates are themselves base64 encoded.
Also makes it clearer what our CABundle validation does and does not do
by adding a standalone validation function and tweaking the error
message for an invalid CA bundle.
Also updates validation to not print CA bundle for Vault issuer when the
bundle is invalid, since it won't help with debugging anything.
Currently the bundle is printed as byte values ("0x32, 0x58, 0x43...")
and in any case printing the whole bundle could be noisy if it's large
Signed-off-by: Ashley Davis <ashley.davis@jetstack.io>
